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Full Idea
In order to make sense of the empirical character of mind-brain identity, we must acknowledge the existence of phenomenal properties.
Clarification
'Phenomenal properties' are raw experiences, like colour
Gist of Idea
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 66)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.66
A Reaction
Mind-brain identity is, of course, an ontological theory, not an epistemological one (like empiricism). I suspect that the basis for my belief in reductive physicalism is an intuition, which I am hoping is a rational intuition. Cf. Idea 3989.
Related Idea
Idea 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]